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Abstract 
 This paper discusses the contribution of street vendors as the majority group of informal 
sector to the generation of local government revenue. Based on the desk study of the available 
literature and research reports on informal sector, this paper analyse how local government 
should tax informal sector to boost its revenue. In the perspective of legalist school, taxing the 
informal sector will only increase the informal sector activity, hence formalising the informal 
sector will not be a recommended policy. Other option to tax the informal sector is by the use of 
informal sector unions which requried an understanding of citizenship and awareness of their 
civil rights to establish them.  This eventually also beneficial for informal sector as the creation 
of informal sector unions means the creation of networks and associations which enable them 
having power vis a vis local government.  
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Introduction  
 Whilst Indonesia is Asia’s fifth largest economy and the fourth most populous nation the 
world which endowed with abundant natural resources, development gap among local 
governments still apparent. With the introduction of Local Autonomy Policy with the Local 
Government Act No. 22 & 25 year 1999, it is expected that better development result across 
local governments in Indonesia can be achieved. However, development will be only possible if 
it is supported with certain amount of financial capacity of the local government.  
 Decentralization requires local governments to be able to generate its own revenue. Local 
government is in a dire need to manage their financial capacity since the degree of independent 
in local revenue will have a positive impact on the degree of local government autonomy. This 
means the more local revenue that a local government can generate, the more autonomy will be 
achieved the local government. The majority of local governments in Indonesia still rely on the 
fiscal transfer from national government. The amount of fiscal transfer follows a certain formula 
that includes factors such as the number of population and the size of the area.  However, in 
reality, a part from this formula, local governments may be able to run a lobby to the national 
government to increase the amount of the fiscal transfer. This has created a window of 
opportunity for bribery. This however disadvantaged other local governments who outperform in 
the lobbying and it will further worsened by the fact that it is difficult to generate local revenue. 
 Decentralization seems to create a high-cost economy primarily due to the euphoria of 
local governments to increase their local-based revenues (Pendapatan Asli Daerah) along with 
political and bureaucratic rent-seeking
3
. The new power of autonomy held by the local 
governments allow them to set up policies to generate money either through natural resource 
exploration (for local government which has many abundant natural resources) or through the 
taxation policies. Further, these taxation policies became reckless policies as local governments 
see anything as a tax object, hence the tax object and tax base has grown too wide, often 
overlapping with the tax policies from national government and at times one objects are being 
taxed with two or more tax policies. Informal sector particularly, such as street vendors is also 
seen as a potential tax object for its visibility by local governments. 
 
What is informal sector? 
 The role of informal sector to local economic development has been discussed by many 
authors. Informal sector is defined as one group of economic arrangements
4
 which are not 
subject to government regulations
5
 and of which the nature of employment is both self 
                                            
3
 Fitrani, F., B. Hofman, and K. Kaiser (2005). Unity in Diversity? the Creation of new local governments in a 
decentralizing Indonesia”. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 41, no. 1 (2005): 57–79. 
 
4
 Gallaway, Julie H and Bernasek, A (2002). Gender and informal Sector Employment in Indonesia, Journal of Economic Issues, 
Vol. XXXVI, No.2 June). 
5
 Castells, M., & Portes, A. (1989). World Underneath: the origins, dynamics, and effects of the informal economy In A. Portes, 
M. Castells, & L. Benton (eds) The informal economy: studies in advanced and less developed countries pp (11-37). Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press. 
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employment such as home production and petty trading and wage employment such as casual 
labour, contract labour and piecework
6
, characterized by small competitive firms, petty retail and 
services, labour-intensive methods, free entry, and market-determined factor and product prices 
as Todaro
7
 argued.  In a less developed world, the informal sector is most visibly appearance in 
the form of street vendors
8
. A further useful discussion of informal sector concept is provided by 
Broad (1991)
9
. 
 There are two contrasted perspective to understand informal sector in relation to formal 
sector. On one end, informal sector is viewed negatively as it is seen as marginalising the poorest 
and the most vulnerable people in the society and the only way to deal with this is through the 
expansion of the formal sector, hence the informal sectors will disappear (Moser, 1984). On the 
other end of perspective, informal sector is seen as a contribution to the economy by providing 
the poorest and the most marginalised people who do not have access to the formal sector with 
opportunities to earn an income. Even though it is claimed that this perspective is a not 
ideological but pragmatic one
10
 (Gallaway, Julie H and Bernasek, A, 2002), it is evident from the 
experience of Indonesia that what seems to be pragmatic turned out to be the most useful 
survival way in the hardest economic hit has ever happened. This pragmatic thinking is in line 
with the approach of the populist critique
11
 (Overton J, 2000).  Populist critique suggests us to 
look up to the informal economy to provide a degree of security for people in a future of 
diminished state support.  
 
Contribution of informal sector to the economy 
 Even though there is a general conception that informal sector is an inferior alternative to 
the formal sector for employment in terms of the earnings, security and protection from 
exploitation regarding such things as labour standards, lending terms, and other contractual 
arrangements. Informal sector also contributes to the national output. In country like Africa, the 
role of the informal sector in the domestic economy is demonstrated in the wide variety of goods 
and services produced by the sector
12
. JASPA (1989) survey concluded that informal sector 
                                            
6
 Gallaway, Julie H and Bernasek, A (2002). Gender and informal Sector Employment in Indonesia, Journal of Economic Issues, 
Vol. XXXVI, No.2 June, p.314 
7
 Todaro, Michael P., (2000), Economic development, 7th ed. Reading, Mass: Adisson Wesley Longman, Inc. p. 749. 
8
 Rachmawati, T. (2013). A survival mechanism for the poor and equity in a mutual symbiosis: a case study of street 
food vendors in urban Indonesia in Gale de Oliveira, M.S., Blacket-Ord, R. And Kennet, M (eds), Green Economics 
& Food, Farming and Agriculture, pp (181- 185). Green Economics Institute. 
9
 Broad, Dave (1991), Global Economic restructuring and the (Re)Casualization of Work in the Centre: With 
Canadian Illustrations, Review Vol.14, No.4, pp.555-94. 
10
 Gallaway, Julie H and Bernasek, A (2002). Gender and informal Sector Employment in Indonesia, Journal of 
Economic Issues, Vol. XXXVI, No.2 June). 
11
 Populist critique is one of critique to capitalism. Populist do not focus on transforming the production relation in 
big capitalism but to winning a space for small producers. They look on the problem of urban bias and 
ineffectiveness of state policies, to reform the state and change the policy in order to protect and further the interests 
of the ‘community’ (Overton j, 2000., p.11). 
12
 ISSER (2003) The State of the Ghanaian Economy in 2002. Accra: The Institute of Statistical, Social and 
Economic Research, University of Ghana. 
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accounts for about 22 percent of real GDP, with the contribution trade and commerce as the 
largest accounting for 52 percent
13
. 
 Recent calculations for developing countries suggest that the informal sector varies from 
between about 20 per cent of GDP in Indonesia to around 67 per cent in Bolivia; and that it 
accounts for over 40 per cent of GDP in twenty-four of the fifty-five countries.
14
 In addition to 
the contribution to the GDP, informal sector may help to create markets, increase financial 
resources, enhance entrepreneurship, and transform the legal, social, and economic institutions 
necessary for accumulation.
15
  
 
 At times of economic crisis, when the number of poor people falls deeper under the 
poverty line seems to be increasing, in Asia (particularly in Indonesia) and in Africa continent 
for example the fee from business license imposed to informal sector traders which were 
increased dramatically in 1998, can be passed on, at least to consumers, many of whom will be 
poor.
16
 This is one aspect that makes informal sector survives through the crisis. 
 According to dualist school of thought on the informal economy, informal economy 
persists due to a slow rate of economic growth and/or to a faster rate of population growth.
17
 
Since population control in Indonesia was rather successful, then the possible cause to the 
growth of informal sector is the economic contraction that has emerged since the Asian crisis in 
1997–98. A quick survey conducted by the World Bank, the Ford Foundation and Statistic 
Indonesia (Badan Pusat Statistik) found that urban areas and Java have been the hardest hit by 
the crisis.
18
 Following the dualist school, the informal sector was the primary cushion for labour 
force in Java and the urban areas during the economic crisis. Low economic growth inhibits the 
labour force from finding employment opportunities in the formal sector, and then forces them to 
enter the informal sector such as small and cottage industries. 
 In the case of Indonesia, the author had come across to a case study where the 
contribution of the informal sector is particularly fascinating. The contribution of street vendors 
in Surakarta Indonesia has shown an increase. 
 
 
 
                                            
13
 ibid 
14
 J. Alm and J. Martinez-Vazquez (eds.) (2003) Public Finance in Developing and Transition Countries: Essays in 
Honor of Richard Bird. Papers presented at a conference at Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State 
University. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar: 146–78 
15 Schneider, F. and R. Klinglmair (2004), Shadow Economies Around the World: What Do We Know?, Discussion 
Paper Series IZA DP No. 1043  http://ftp.iza.org/dp1043.pdf 
16
 Devas, Nick and Korboe, David., (2000), City governance and poverty: the case of kumasi, Environment and 
Urbanization, 12: 123 
17
 Chen, M. A. (2007). Rethinking the Informal Economy: Linkages with the Formal Economy and the Formal 
Regulatory Environment, DESA Working paper No. 46, United Nations. 
http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2007/wp46_2007.pdf 
18
 Watterberg, A., S. Sumarto, and L. Prittchett. (1999). A National Snapshot of the Social Impact of Indonesia’s 
Crisis,  Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 35, no. 3: 145–52. 
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Table 1.  The contribution of street vendors in Surakarta Indonesia 
Year Amount  
2002 IDR 120.120.900 
2003 IDR 150.306.400 
2004 IDR 150.449.200 
2005 IDR 153. 000.000 
2006 IDR 155.000.000 
2007 IDR 155.000.000 
2008 IDR 208.250.000 
2009 IDR 98.474.800 
2010 IDR 239.175.000 
Source: KOMPIP 2011 in Rachmawati (2013) 
 Although the data in the table above had been used as a justification on how local 
government policy on street vendors e.g. street vendors re-location,
19
 it showed the possibility of 
potential revenue that local government can generate if the street vendors as part of informal 
sector are taxed.   
 Report on the realisation of Surakarta city regional budget on 2008 showed that with the 
amount of money generated from the informal sector tax was IDR 208.250.000. Further, there 
was an amount of around IDR 2.4 billion dedicated to the development of informal sector (street 
vendors). There is an indication that the amount of money to manage the informal sector has 
taken up a significant amount of the regional budget and yet the contribution of the informal 
sector is only about 8.6%.  
 The budget for the informal sector development is thought as an investment that it is 
expected in the future the taxation from informal sector will balance with the money spent for the 
development and further expected to increase when the informal sector is graduated to a more 
formal sector. Yet, it is important to note that high taxes in countries with large informal 
economy will only induce non compliance (informal sector) that reduces the government revenue 
and thus in return also reduce the amounts of funds available to provide and maintain market-
supporting, public goods and services such as the court system, government administration, 
agencies.
20
 
 
 
 
                                            
19
 Rachmawati (2013), Re-location for a better livelihood: a case study of street vendors in local authorities in 
Indonesia, International Journal of Green Economics, Forthcoming 2013. 
 
20
 Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D. and Zoido-Lobaton, P. (1998), Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy, 
American Economic Review 88(2): 387–432 
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To Tax or Not To Tax 
 Further fieldwork by the author has suggested that the perspective to approach the issue 
of informal sector is from the perspective of local government revenue generation. The local 
government of Surakarta recognised the importance of informal sector contribution to the local 
government revenue (based on interview with the Mayor and Vice Mayor of Surakarta on 9 
April 2011 and 10 April 2011).  
 An illustration on the potentials of informal sector is a food street vendor who runs his 
business almost twice a day. Adek, being his name a middle aged seller who sells a chicken 
porridge in the morning and meatball soup in the afternoon with his mobile cart. A street vendor 
like Adek can be found throughout the area in Indonesia and if each of street vendors does their 
business twice, hence the local government is able to tax them twice as well. This means double 
the money.  
 However, it is argued that the informal sector employment and incomes are notoriously 
difficult to tax, particularly street vendors.
21
 Joshi and Ayee in Brautigam, Fjelstad and Moore 
(eds.) (2008)
22
 gave a very interesting chapter on how informal sector in three developing 
countries and how the difficulties to tax the informal sector.  
 Most professional tax specialists tend to be sceptical on pragmatic grounds. Why chase 
after a sector where the direct costs of collection will be high in relation to the revenue raised, 
and where the costs of compliance might weigh heavily on the taxpayers themselves.
23
 It is 
suggested that losses from not taxing the informal sector could amount to 35–55 per cent of total 
tax revenues in some countries.
24
 
25
 The conventional package of tax reforms does not directly 
address the issue and has largely failed to make significant inroads into the informal sector.
26
 
27
 
The obvious challenge for governments then is to tap into this potentially large revenue source, 
while simultaneously keeping the costs of collection low.  
 A study of informal sector by two Christian Aid’s partner in Ghana28 has established that 
current tax system is not fair and inclusive for women in informal sector. They pay the taxes but 
often denied services provision by local government.  
 
Conclusion: how best to tax? 
                                            
21
 Livingstone, I. and Charlton, R. 2001. ‘Financing Decentralized Development in a Low-Income Country: Raising 
Revenue for Local Government in Uganda’, Development and Change 32: 77–100. 
22
 Joshi, A. and Ayee, J., Associational taxation: a pathway into the informal sector in Bräutigam, Fjeldstad and 
Moore eds. (2008), Taxation and state-Building in developing countries, Camridge, University Press. 
23
 ibid 
24
 J. Alm and J. Martinez-Vazquez (eds.) (2003) Public Finance in Developing and Transition Countries: Essays in 
Honor of Richard Bird. Papers presented at a conference at Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State 
University. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar: 146–78. 
25
 Terkper, S. 2003. ‘Managing Small and Medium-sized Taxpayers in Developing Countries’, Tax Notes 
International 29(2): 211–29. 
26
 Smith, L. 2003. ‘The Power of Politics: The Performance of the South African Revenue Service and Some of its 
Implications’, Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies Policy: Issues and Actors 16(2): 1–19. 
27
 Stiglitz, J. 2003. ‘Populists are Sometimes Right.’ Project Syndicate. www. project-syndicate.org. 
28
 Caroll (2011), Taxing Ghana’s informal sector: the experience of women, Christian Aid Occasional Paper 
Number 7, Christian Aid.  
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 Pimhidzai and Fox (2010)
29
 Recognising the characteristics of informal sector is 
important as a way to avoid the wrong policy recommendations that forcefully push the 
formalising of informal sector. This is done with reasoning that the formalising informal sector 
can affect the increase of productivity and their contribution to the local government revenue 
generation. Further, their research concluded that if the tax structure is progressive, then the 
formalisation of the informal sector could threaten the viability of the smallest enterprises and 
push poor people who can only find informal sector as the main source of livelihood fall back 
into poverty.  
 According to the legalist school, micro-entrepreneurs will continue to produce informally 
even though they are stifled by unreasonable government rules and regulations. In the extreme 
situation, informal entrepreneurs do business informally as a response to high taxation and 
regulation enforced by the government. In other words, high cost of formality tends to increase 
the informal sector activity. Other factors that explain informal sector activity include the quality 
of public sector services.
30
  
 
 One of suggested method of collecting tax on informal sector is using the unions of 
informal sectors as collection agents. Considering the fact that the unions of informal sector such 
as union of street vendors had detailed knowledge of the activities of their members and could 
collect taxes without much effort, colleting tax through unions will probably be most effective.  
 
 The scheme was relatively easy to administer. Taking the example of taxing the informal 
sector in Ghana
31
, tax was collected at the lorry parks, which were under the control of the 
unions. Operators were liable for taxes only on the days they actually worked. This will 
maximise the tax collection to food street vendors like Adek (in the example above) who run his 
business with his mobile chart twice a day. It could also be one of the considerations to 
implement fairer tax to street vendors as it is collected to the street vendors who actually run the 
business on the day. Taxes were initially collected daily and then, to save on the costs of printing 
receipts, weekly. The union was offered a 2.5 per cent share of the total collection.  
 
 However, setting up unions of informal sector is not an easy job. To be able to form a 
union, there must be certain level of understanding of citizenship and the awareness of the right 
to articulate their interest and voice their needs. The establishment of union is not only beneficial 
for the local government in terms of taxation but it also valuable for the informal sector such as 
street vendors as it can be used as a channel for articulating the informal sector interest. Being in 
a union may also be useful for the informal sector to have stronger bargain power over local 
government service. Despite their informality, these small entrepreneurs pay their local 
                                            
29
 Pimhidzai and Fox (2010), Taking from the poor or local economic development: the dillema of taxation of smal 
informal enteprises in Uganda, the World Bank Africa Regional Project on Improving the Productivity and 
Reducing Risk of Household Enterprises.  
https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=CSAE2012&paper_id=500 
 
30
 Schneider, F. and R. Klinglmair (2004), Shadow Economies Around the World: What Do We Know?, Discussion 
Paper Series IZA DP No. 1043  http://ftp.iza.org/dp1043.pdf 
31
 Joshi, A. and Ayee, J., Associational taxation: a pathway into the informal sector in Bräutigam, Fjeldstad and 
Moore eds. (2008), Taxation and state-Building in developing countries, Camridge, University Press. 
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government taxes and even some state-level taxes, but they continue to receive little in the way 
of basic services in return. 
 
 Research on building political voice within the informal economy argues that the way 
forward lies not only in creating networks and associations in order to facilitate participation in 
local governance structures, but in actually empowering those associations to make effective 
claims on government. 
 
 The establishment of informal sector unions does not necessarily mean that it will 
provide a representation of institutional channels. Dickovick (in press)
32
 studied collective action 
by informal enterprises in the transport and street-vending sectors in three localities in Lima and 
in the city of Chicalayo. This study showed that in a circumstance where the local government 
are under pressure to raise revenue, they will try to employ whatever capacity they have to 
enforce tax collection in a confrontational way rather than negotiate with the informal sector. If 
the unions have not shown strong representation, it will probably then loses its opportunity for 
collective action. Without strong collective action, the union will be hardly able to do anything 
when there are no tangible services provided by the local governments even though the informal 
sectors are paying the tax. 
 
 On the contrary, when the local government have not been under pressure to generate 
revenue, they will be more open to negotiation with the informal sector. In one of Dickovick case 
study, in Centro locality of Lima, the municipality has been able to negotiate with street vendors 
associations with mutually satisfactory outcomes: an agreement not to tax them in light of the 
‘extraordinary economic crisis’ in exchange for their agreement to move from the valuable land 
they have invaded in the city centre to a less expensive area (ibid. 19). This is the kind of 
bargaining that has also happened in Surakarta city in Indonesia (Rachmawati, 2013). 
 
Conclusion  
 
 Learning from the discussion above, street vendors as the most majority of the informal 
sector and the most visible form of informal sector, do contribute significantly to the economy 
within a locality. It contributes to the growth of local economy because street vendors’ reliance 
on locally available resources. It has all the potential to contribute to the local government 
revenue and this potential will be greatly improved with better tax collection and tax 
management. It will result on better public service provision to the community at the end. On a 
larger scale, this will impact on the increasing financial capacity of local governments. Good 
management of local (natural) economic resources, add with higher local revenue will create a 
more stabilised local economic development. 
 In national scale, a country is in better position when it exports more and import less. 
This also applies to informal sector. Informal sector plays a significant role in the green economy 
for its financial limitations to import particularly import an advance technology. Even though it 
                                            
32
 Dickovick, J. T. (in press). ‘The ‘‘Colectivo’’ Action Problem: The Local Politics of Small Business in Peru’, in 
K. Burgess (ed.) Between Cooperation and Suspicion: Civil Society and the State in Peru. Syracuse: Global Affairs 
Institute. 
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can be disadvantage but it also encourages the creation of low and better suited technology for 
informal sectors. Informal sector also rely on low cost and locally available scrap construction 
materials. This has been regarded a disadvantage for it has seen as an infringement to safety and 
hygiene, yet it can also be a good way to conserve the environment in the form of recycling 
program. 
 A fairer tax collection will only happen when local governments are able to ensure that 
upon the tax collection, a better service provision to informal sector in infrastructure and other 
services will be established. Hence, the habitat characteristic of informal sector to create 
environmental hazardous and depletion is reduced to a minimum level. Also, with the better 
infrastructure service provision, it will stop the informal sector to unauthorised use of vacant 
public or private and to unauthorised construction of structure and buildings. 
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